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Abstract
Using a simple single-equation approach, many studies have shown that the term structure of interest
rates or its approximation - the term spread is a potentially useful indicator of future inﬂation and/or
future real economic activity. We argue that these results may be biased due to the insuﬃciencies of
the single-equation approach and that the predictive ability must be analyzed from within a model
framework. Simple general equilibrium macroeconomic model of a small open economy is introduced
and the indicative properties of the term structure are discussed from within its framework.
Our main contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we show that the predictive ability of the
term spread is not structural but monetary policy dependent. Second, we argue that the term spread’s
predictive ability with regard to future inﬂation (real economic activity) increases with increasing weight
on inﬂation (real economic activity) stabilization in central bank’s reaction function. Third, we show
that undestanding the way expectations are formed is an important prerequisite for using the term
structure as an indicator for monetary policy.
Apart from these general ﬁndings, the predictive power of the term spread is examined in the case
of the Czech economy. It is shown that the term spread between one year and three month PRIBOR
interest rates of one percentage point indicates that agents expect inﬂation to be almost one percentage
point above the target six quarters ahead.
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11. Introduction
The forward-looking character of monetary policy, that is due to ”long and variable lags”
in transmission, combined with uncertainty of future economic development requires that some
kind of intermediate policy target or forecast be employed. Recently, however, many central
banks changed their policy strategy to direct inﬂa t i o nt a r g e t i n ga n dt h ew e i g h tp u to ni n t e r -
mediate targets (e.g. money stock in monetary targeting) thus went down substantially. At
the same time, this led to a marked increase in the importance of macroeconomic forecasts for
monetary policy. Inﬂation targeting is a strategy essentially based on (inﬂation) forecasts, a
fact reﬂected by its complementary label ”inﬂation forecast targeting”.
While there is no alternative for central bank’s own (structural model-based) inﬂation fore-
cast in the conduct of monetary policy through inﬂation targeting, various indicators may serve
as a useful cross-check and a supplementary policy guide. We think of indicators as variables
from which it is possible to extract agents’ expectations about future economic development
even though they do not necessarily cause this future development. Apart from reﬂecting market
expectations, indicators bear other favorable properties that distinguish them from macroeco-
nomic forecasts: they are usually available with higher frequency and they are not subject to
data revisions.
Various authors have shown that one of the most useful monetary policy indicators is the
term structure of interest rates. The whole term structure is usually approximated by a single
variable called term spread,c a l c u l a t e da sad i ﬀerence between long-term and short-term interest
rates. What does the term spread tell us? There are basically two separate lines of research in
the area. The ﬁrst tests the predictive power of the term spread for future inﬂation. Mishkin
(1990a, 1990b, 1991), Fama (1990), Jorion-Mishkin (1991), Ragan (1995), Estrella-Mishkin
(1997), Day-Lange (1997), Breedon-Chadha (1997) or Kozicki (1998) argue that positive current
term spread is associated with positive future inﬂation or its dynamics, and vice-versa. The
second line of research is aimed at examining the predictive power of the term spread for future
real economic activity. Hu (1993), Plosser and Rouwenhorst (1994), Cozier and Tkacz (1994),
Bernard and Gerlach (1996), Estrella and Mishkin (1996), Haubrich and Dombrosky (1996),
Bonser-Neal and Morley (1997), Kozicki (1997), Smets and Tsatsaronis (1997), Estrella (1997),
Attna-Mensaha and Tkacz (1998) or Berk and Van Bergeijk (2000) show that positive current
2term spread is associated with future rise in real economic activity, and vice-versa. The results
of those of the mentioned studies that take a multi-country approach are reported in table A1
in the Appendix. Similar research has also been conducted in the context of the small open
Czech economy by Kotlán (1999a, 1999b) who tests the indicative property of the term spread
for future inﬂation and future real economic activity respectively. The term spread has been
found to forecast future inﬂation with a lead of 6 quarters and future real economic activity 3
quarters ahead.
The empirical methodology of the above mentioned studies is usually based on standard
reduced form regressions or VARs without much discussion of the underlying theory. We want
to argue that the results based on such an approach are subject to three types of criticism.
First, it is unclear whether rising (falling) term spread in any moment in time indicates future
rise (fall) in inﬂa t i o no ri nr e a le c o n o m i ca c t i v i t yo ri nb o t ha n dw h a tt h ef u t u r el e v e l so ft h e s e
variables should be. Second, even though monetary policy is conventionally believed to aﬀect
the term spread to a great extent, the mentioned approaches do not take its role explicitly into
account. This point is further discussed in the following chapter in connection with the rational
expectations hypothesis (REH). Third, the reduced form techniques applied are by themselves
not well ﬁt to evaluate the indicative content of the term structure or any other indicator. The
idea behind this crucial argument was put forward by Woodford (1994) and further reﬁned by
Bernanke and Woodford (1997). Let us provide a simple informal exposition of the argument.
Suppose a central bank whose only objective is to keep inﬂation at the level given by its inﬂation
target uses a certain variable called X as the only indicator of future inﬂationary pressures.
Suppose positive X indicates future inﬂation above the target and negative X indicates future
inﬂation below the target. Since the bank’s goal is too keep inﬂation on target, it will — based
on what the indicator suggests — take such measures so as to reach the target in the future. In
the end, if X is used for setting monetary policy and if the policy is successful, what shall we
see in the data? We will most likely see that while X has moved around, inﬂation has stayed
at the target level. Reduced form econometric techniques might then lead to a conclusion that
there is no relation between indicator X and (lagged) inﬂation.2
2The same argument applies to the reason why it is often the case that regressing inﬂation data on lagged
values of central bank’s interest rates leads to a conclusion that the central bank does not aﬀect inﬂation. This
is one of the reasons why it is crucial that inﬂation forecasts used for monetary policy are based on a structural
3These criticisms can be avoided if the predictive power of the term spread is examined
from a perspective of a general equilibrium macroeconomic framework.3 The idea of looking
at the term structure of interest rate from within a broader range of macroeconomic relations
is not new. Mankiw and Miron (1986), McCallum (1994), Rudebusch (1995) and Roley and
Sellon (1996) use simple two-equation systems composed of the REH-based term structure
equation and central bank’s reaction function in order to improve on the empirical results of
testing the REH. Complex general equilibrium macroeconomic models have, however, been
used in this context only in several studies. Turnovsky (1989) examines interactions of various
macroeconomic policies and the term structure using a simple macro model. Fuhrer and Moore
(1995) in their seminal study look at the observed correlation between the Fed Funds rate
and real economic activity through following interest rate transmission along the yield curve.
Eijjﬁnger et al. (2000) discuss implications of the REH for inﬂation targeting. Finally, Estrella
(1998) whose approach is closest to ours, analytically solves a simple macroeconomic model
with emphasis on directly linking the term spread with the predicted variable (inﬂation, real
economic activity). Although we follow up on this body of research, our aim and approach
diﬀer.
In this paper we re-examine the relationship(s) between the term spread and future inﬂation
and/or future real economic activity. Our goal is to ﬁnd out whether the proposed relationship
is structural or policy dependent and whether it is inﬂuenced by the way in which agents
form expectations. The approach we take diﬀers in three respects. First, while all the studies
mentioned in the previous paragraph examine the term structure indicative properties within
ac l o s e de c o n o m y ,w ea r et h eﬁrst to do so using a small open economy modeling framework.
For this purpose we choose the Czech economy. Second, and again contrary to the mentioned
studies, our key model equations are estimated and the results should thus closely track the
real data. Third, we examine the relationship using model simulations, not analytical solutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in chapter 2. Chapter 3
examines the role of monetary policy goals and expectations formation on the predictive ability
model.
3It could be argued that in order to completely avoid the criticisms, the policy related model coeﬃcients
should all be calibrated based on micro foundations. However, as will be discussed in the following chapter,
reduced form estimation might be an option in cases when state-of-the-art theory contrasts the real world data.
4of the term spread using model simulations. Finally, chapter 4 concludes.
2. The model
For our purposes we chose to build a quarterly monetary business cycle model. While
building the model, three general principles were applied. First, behavioral equations should
be ﬁrmly grounded in economic theory. Second, the model should be as simple as possible.
And last but not least, the equations should closely resemble the Czech economy. Where these
principles come into conﬂict, the latest one is chosen as a guiding one and comments on possible
alternative speciﬁcations are provided.
IS curve
The ﬁrst equation specﬁes aggregate demand determination. All variables are deviations
from long-term equilibrium trend:
yt = α11yt−1 + α12Rt−1 + α13y∗
t−3 + α14qt−1 + shockIS
t (1)
The left-hand side (LHS) variable yt is the output gap. The data were obtained by sub-
tracting quarterly real GDP data from estimated potential output series using Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) ﬁlter.4 The output gap enters the right hand side (RHS) of equation (1) with a one period
lag. Optimizing-agent-based forward-looking speciﬁcation complemented by explicitly modeled
habit formation — in order to reﬂect high output persistency — as in Fuhrer (2000) or McCalum
(2001) was judged inferior to the ﬁnal speciﬁcation based on the above mentioned principles,
namely data consistency and simplicity principle.5 T h es e c o n dt e r mo nt h eR H SRt−1 is one
period lagged real long-term interest rate. Here, we use 1Y PRIBOR (Prague Interbank Oﬀered
Rate) deﬂated by expected CPI inﬂation. As the data on inﬂation expectations in the Czech
economy are only available since May 1999, we approximate the expectation formation process.
4In the case of the domestic output gap, we had a strong view as to the current output gap value. To account
for this view, variant of HP ﬁlter due to Laxton-Rose-Xiu (LRX) was used that makes it possible to expertly
adjust the end-point of the gap (-1,0 p.p. in 1Q2001 in this case).
5Further, the optimizing approaches apply to consumption, which usually forms a smaller part of the total
GDP in small open economies that in large closed economies.
5Concretely, we suppose that one ﬁfth of agents form expectations rationally (actual CPI inﬂa-
tion 4 quarters ahead, i.e. ”perfect foresight”) and four ﬁfths adaptively (actual CPI inﬂation
lagged one quarter, i.e. the last observation). We suppose the same expectations formation
process in the baseline model simulations in chapter 3 and thus set β11 = 0,8 in equation (10)
below. In simulations, long-term real interest rate is determined by the real version of the term
structure equation (equations 5 and 7 below). The third term on the RHS y∗
t−3 stands for three
periods lagged foreign demand. The lag reﬂects our belief on the relatively long duration of
foreign trade contracts. Foreign demand is proxied by German GDP gap. The forth term on the
RHS qt−1 is one period lagged real exchange rate representing relative price between domestic
and foreign goods that inﬂuences net exports. Note that a rise in q stands for depreciation
of the exchange rate. Since most of the Czech foreign trade takes place with Germany and
other EU countries, CZK/DEM (equivalent in dynamics to CZK/EUR since 1999) exchange
rate deﬂated by CPI rates of inﬂation is used. It was mentioned that all variables are deviations
from trend. In terms of the real exchange rate we think of the observed long-term appreciation
(about 5 % year to year) as reﬂecting real convergence and Balassa-Samuelson driven relative
price structure adjustment. The last term on the RHS shockIS
t is a demand shock.
The coeﬃcients were estimated by OLS using data for 3Q1994 - 1Q2001.6 Their values
correspond to economic intuition. The inﬂuence of the lagged output gap α11 =0 , 9 7c o n ﬁrms
very high persistency of real economic activity and the inﬂuence of the foreign demand α13 =
0,47 reﬂects high income elasticity of Czech exports as well as the fact that exports form a
substantial part of Czech GDP. The level of long-term real interest rates 1 p.p. above equilib-
rium causes, with a one quarter lag, fall of real output one ﬁfth of a percentage point below
equilibrium (α12 = 0,22), the inﬂuence of the real exchange rate is about the same in magnitude
(α14= -0,20).
6The coeﬃcients were all signiﬁcant at standard levels; adjusted R2 equaled 0,95; LM (4) test was at 4,36
and S. E. of regression was 0,01.
6Phillips curve
The second equation - a ”Phillips curve” - links nominal and real variables supposing short-
term stickiness in prices and wages. Our speciﬁcation is in line with Calvo’s (1983) model of
staggered prices setting, hence the introduction of forward-looking inﬂation expectations on the
R H So fe q u a t i o n( 2 ) :
πt = α21Πe
t+4 + α22π∗
t−1 +( 1 − α21 − α22)(st − st−1)4+α23yt + shockPC
t (2)
The term on the LHS πt stands for quarter to quarter annualized CPI inﬂation. The ﬁrst
term on the RHS Πe
t+4 represents current inﬂa t i o ne x p e c t a t i o n so fy e a rt oy e a ri n ﬂation 4
quarters ahead (equation 9 below). This speciﬁcation reﬂects a common belief that the higher
the inﬂation, the more frequently contracts get re-negotiated. Consequently, there are lower
nominal rigidities in the economy. While this may not be the case of other small open transition
economies, in the Czech economy we suppose an average contract duration of one year, and
hence we work with 4 quarter ahead inﬂation expectations. In estimations, expected inﬂation is
determined as described above, equation (10) is used for simulations. The second term on the
RHS π∗
t−1 stands for one period lagged foreign quarter to quarter annualized inﬂation, proxied
by German PPI. The third term (st − st−1) represents quarter to quarter (annualized in eq.
2) change in nominal CZK/DEM exchange rate. These two terms are intended to capture
the foreign inﬂuence on the domestic price development. The choice of German PPI rests on
the idea that this price index reﬂects the inﬂuence of both intermediate goods prices and raw
material prices on the domestic price formation process.7 The imposed linear homogeneity in
the inﬂation terms of equation (2) reﬂects the assumption of vertical long-term Phillips curve:
there is no long run trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and growth. The fourth term yt is the output
gap and reﬂects the price pressures arising from excess demand. We believe that the current
output gap captures the inﬂuence of past excess demand (due to high output persistency) but
also makes it possible to grasp the role of forward-looking agents on price determination. The
last term on the RHS shockPC
t is a ”cost-push” supply shock.
7Imported inﬂation could, of course, be modeled using alternative speciﬁcations. For instance, it would be
possible to trace the separate inﬂuences of import prices, raw material prices and complement the current setting
by the CZK/USD exchange rate reﬂecting the trade in raw materials.
7The coeﬃcients estimated by OLS are in line with our expectations and small open economies
stylized facts.8 From the ”inﬂation terms”, foreign inﬂation (0,46) together with the nominal
exchange rate dynamics (0,22) have the strongest inﬂuence. Inﬂation expectations enter the
equation with expected sign, however, the coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant on standard levels. We
believe this result may be connected to our speciﬁcation of the expectation formation process.
Since we experiment with this process later on, we decided to calibrate this coeﬃcient on the
level of the original estimate (0,32). This corresponds to international evidence, see for example
Bank of England (1999) or Laxton and Scott (2000). The estimates further showed that cycli-
cal position of the economy has strong inﬂuence on the determination of prices. Real output
standing one percentage point above its potential increases inﬂation by 0,61 p.p.
Uncovered Interest Rate Parity
The arbitrage-based UIP speciﬁcation posits that the expected change in domestic exchange
rate is equal to the current diﬀerential between domestic and foreign interest rates reduced by
a risk premium:
se
t+1 − st =( It − I∗
t − dispt)/4,
where se
t+1 is expected nominal exchange rate one period ahead, st stands for current nominal
exchange rate. Exchange rate is expressed in domestic units per unit of foreign currency and
as was mentioned above, rise in st reﬂects a depreciation. It and I∗
t stand for long-term (here
one year) nominal domestic and foreign interest rate respectively.9 The term disp is to capture
all the disparities between actual exchange rate development and that implied by risk-free UIP.
These disparities can be attributed both to the risk premium and to temporary shocks. As an
example of transition-economy-speciﬁc temporary shock consider a foreign capital inﬂow driven
appreciation of domestic currency that is due to privatization of domestic assets. Expected
exchange rate can be modeled in various ways. In the equation below we think of the agents
in the ﬁnancial market to be divided into two groups. One group of participants with weight
8Adjusted R2 equaled 0,42; DW test was at 2,18 and S. E. of the regression was found to be just 0,03.
9For a discussion of proper interest rate maturity to enter UIP equation see Derviz (1999). Note that the
interest rate diﬀerential is divided by four to reﬂect quarter to quarter speciﬁcation.
8α31 forms ”model consistent” expectations while the other group with weight (1 — α31)f o r m s
expectations by adding expected equilibrium real appreciation (∆q
eq
t ) adjusted by expected
inﬂation diﬀerential (πe
t+1 − πe∗
t+1 ) to the last observed exchange rate value.10 This is to
reﬂect the common knowledge of real exchange rate trend appreciation in converging economies
mentioned already in the discussion of the aggregate demand equation. In line with past data
we set ∆q
eq
t = 5 %. Formally:
se












This speciﬁcation not only tracks the data closer but also partially solves too high a volatility
o fe x c h a n g er a t eu s u a l l yo b s e r v e di nm o d e l sw i t hp u r eU I Ps p e c i ﬁcation. We set the fraction
of agents forming exchange rate expectations in a ”model-consistent” manner equal to that on
the goods market, i.e. α31 =0 , 2 . 11 We later experiment with this coeﬃcient. Combining the
two equations and supplementing the result with a shock term (shockUIP
t ), we obtain:















10Even though the real exchange rate is CPI based (see eq. 1), we proxy foreign inﬂa t i o ni ne q u a t i o n s( 3 )
and (9) below by German PPI. We believe this simpliﬁcation does not have a great impact on the results.
Alternatively we could explicitly model the connection between German PPI and CPI (or Czech CPI and PPI)
but this would go against our simplicity principle.
11One the one hand, it could be argued that agents on the ﬁnancial market are more forward-looking than
agents on the goods market. On the other hand, though, it has been argued that the best exchange rate prediction
is a naive random walk model. Further, we believe most agents will put a strong weight on the known equilibrium
long-term appreciation.
9Central bank reaction function
The reaction function is to capture the agents’ perceived pattern of central bank behavior.
We do not attempt to explicitly derive reaction function through loss function optimization and
instead suppose a standard forward-looking equation as in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1997) or
Woodford (2000):















The LHS variable it is 3M PRIBOR interest rate that closely tracks the actual Czech
national bank’s instrument 2W repo rate. The RHS includes deviation of four quarters ahead
expected inﬂation from the corresponding inﬂation target (Πtar
t+4) and an output gap term. The
ﬁrst two terms in brackets stand to represent equilibrium nominal short-term interest rate as
a sum of equilibrium real short-term interest rate (r
eq
t ) and a corresponding inﬂation target.
Equation (4) is supplemented by one period lagged short-term nominal interest rate to reﬂect the
observed persistence in short rates. This so called ”interest rate smoothing” may be explained
by monetary policy uncertainties, central bankers’ fear from ”loosing face” or simply by an
eﬀort not to destabilize the markets.12 The last term in equation (4) stands for a reaction
function or a ”monetary” shock.
The coeﬃcients were calibrated using the ranges estimated by Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(1997). The authors examining reaction functions of Germany, Japan, USA, UK, France and
Italy came up with the range of 0,9 - 0,95 for α41, 0,9 - 2,04 for α42 and 0,19 - 0,88 for α43.
We experiment with the values of these coeﬃcients in chapter 3 but the baseline simulations
are based on α41 =0 , 8 ;α42 =2aα43 =0 , 9 . T h i sm e a n sw es t a r to ﬀ with less aggressive
”smoothing” coeﬃcient and upper bound coeﬃcient on deviation of inﬂation from target. This
is to reﬂect a more aggressive policy usually observed in the ﬁrst years after the switch to
inﬂation targeting strategy that is due both to credibility problems and the fact that many
central banks use inﬂation targeting for disinﬂation purposes. At the same time we increase the
weight assigned to output stabilization. This should reﬂect the fact that many central banks of
12Lansing (2001) interestingly argues that the observed persistency in short-term interest rates is given by
central bank’s inability to identify changes in trend growth of potential output.
10small open transition economies implicitly target ’sustainable’ external balance and that this
balance is driven to a large extent by excessive demand pressures.
Long-term interest rate determination - rational expectations hypothesis
The last behavioral equation determines the long-term nominal interest rate based on the
REH and is understandably a key relationship in our model. The REH can be formally expressed
as:
It = α51it +( 1 − α51)
1
4
(it + Etit+1 + Etit+2 + Etit+3)+zt, (5)
where α51 represents the share of agents that form their expectations about future short-
term interest rates in a rather adaptive way. If α51 equals zero, the equation collapses into
expectations hypothesis. The last term zt is a term premium. We suppose it evolves according
to an autoregressive process of the form:
zt = α52zt−1 + shockTS
t , (6)
where shockTS
t is a term premium shock with persistency given by α52.W e s t a r t o ﬀ by
supposing α52 equals zero, i.e. no persistency. The term premium reﬂects agents’ uncertainty
on future interest rate behavior and could be decomposed into uncertainty about future central
bank reaction function and future shocks hitting the economy. Since the agents that are unsure
about the CB’s reaction function may prefer to set current long-term nominal interest rate
at current short-term interest rate level, the ﬁrst type of uncertainty can also be modeled by
increasing α51. This is done in the following chapter.
Although empirical tests of the REH have long been quite popular, the results remain mixed.
T h i sm a yb ep a r t l yd u et om i s - s p e c i ﬁcations of some of the tests, as pointed out by Bekaert,
Hodrick and Marshall (1997). Theretical reasons or the empirical failure of the REH are put
forth by Mankiw and Miron (1986) and McCallum (1994). The authors examine the inﬂuence
of monetary policy on the validity of the REH in practice. They argue that the high ”interest
rate smoothing” that results in high autocorrelation of short-term interest rates, may stand
behind the observed high inﬂuence of current short-term interest rates on long-term interest
11rates (coeﬃcient α52 above). The ﬁrst study even concludes that the REH started to fail in
1914 when the Fed was established. We believe that exactly for the mentioned reasons — the
inﬂuence of monetary policy on the REH — it is insuﬃc i e n tt ot e s tt h eR E Hu s i n gas i n g l e -
equation approach. If this inﬂuence is to be taken into account, one needs to endogenously
model the behavior of monetary authority as well. This is the approach we take below. The
baseline simulations are based on the results of Kotlán (1999c), who conﬁrms the validity of
the REH in the Czech money market by comparing actual long-term interest rates with those
implied by the current term spread. We thus start oﬀ by setting α51equal to zero.
Exogenous variables
Instead of explicitly modeling the behavior and the inter-relations of exogenous variables,
we simply suppose that foreign inﬂation, output gap and interest rates evolve independently
of each other based upon an autoregressive process. This is supplemented by a stochastic
term with zero mean value that serves as a shock to foreign variables at the same time. The
autoregressive coeﬃcient is set to 0,5 in equation (13) and (14) determining foreign inﬂation
and output gap respectively, and to 0,8 in equation (15) determining foreign long-term interest
rates.
The ﬁnal speciﬁcations of the model equations including the values of the coeﬃcients as
discussed above that will be used for our baseline simulations in the following chapter are
reported below. The model characteristics have been checked using a series of simulations.
Speciﬁcally we ran simulations of ﬁve standard unexpected temporary (1 quarter) one percent-
age point shocks: demand, supply (cost push), foreign inﬂation, exchange rate and reaction
function shocks simulations were undertaken. The responses (deviations from equilibrium) over
16 quarters are plotted in ﬁgures A1 - A5 in the Appendix. They have been compared to the
ones of Svensson’s (2000) small open economy model and found broadly consistent.
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13Coefficient Value (S.E. if
estimated)
Interpretation Equation
11 0,97 (0,05) Output gap persistency
12 -0,22 (0,08) Long-term real interest rate
13 0,47 (0,26) Foreign output gap
14 0,20 (0,05) Real exchange rate
(1) IS curve
21 0,32 (0,31) Inflation expectations
22 0,46 (0,32) Foreign inflation
(1-21-22) 0,22 Nominal exchange rate dynamics
23 0,61 (0,28) Output gap
(2) Phillips curve
31 0,2 Fraction of model consistent exp. (3) UIP
41 0,8 Interest rate smoothing
42 2 Inflation gap
43 0,9 Output gap
(4) CB’s reaction function
51 0 Fraction of non-REH agents (5) Long IR determination (REH)
52 0 Term structure shock persistency (6) Term structure shock eq.
11 0,8 Fraction of backward-looking agents (10) Inflation expectations
 0,5 Autoregressive foreign inflation (13) Foreign inflation
 0,5 Autoregressive foreign output gap (14) Foreign output gap
 0,8 Autoregressive foreign long-term IR (15) Foreign long-term interest rates
3. The term spread as an indicator
After discussing the motivation in the ﬁrst chapter and introducing the model in the previous
chapter, we now approach the very questions posited in the introduction. First, in section 3.1
we explore whether the indicative abilities of the term spread deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 1 2 )a b o v e
are dependent on monetary policy preferences approximated by the central bank’s reaction
function.13 Second, in section 3.2 we examine the inﬂuence of the way agents form their
expectations. In both cases we do so by simulating model consistent reactions of chosen variables
to macroeconomic shocks. In contrast to the simulations shown in the Appendix, the shocks we
subject the model to in this chapter are all expected shocks.14 This is to reﬂect the idea that
forward-looking agents react to expected future economic events in advance. We investigate the
13The term ”approximated” reﬂects the fact that deriving reaction function from central bank’s loss function
(that depicts preferences) is, under given model relationships, likely to lead to inclusion of terms that might not
appear in the loss function itself.
14Although certain type of shocks (e.g. oil price shocks) are mostly unexpected, various other events shifting
the system potentially out of equilibrium are expected in advance (e.g. future rise in taxes).
14responses of inﬂation, real economic activity and the term spread in reaction to future expected
temporary one percentage point demand and supply (cost-push) shocks. We always shock the
model eight quarters after the simulation starts. The graphical results of the following two
sections are further scrutinized in the last section of this chapter.
Figure 1 below shows the results of a baseline simulation, i.e. a simulation where all the
coeﬃcients stay as estimated or calibrated in the previous chapter. These responses form a
”benchmark” to which all later simulations will be compared.




























Let us ﬁrst brieﬂy discuss the response of the economy to an expected demand shock depicted
in the left hand panel of ﬁgure 1. After the initial small fall in output, that is due to restrictive
inﬂuence of expectations driven real exchange rate appreciation, the output gap strongly jumps
up in the eight quarter. The above mentioned high persistency of real economic activity causes
t h es p i k ei no u t p u tg a pt ob el i t t l eb e l o wo n ep e r c e n t a g ep o i n t . P o s i t i v eo u t p u tg a pa n d
expectations of future rise in year to year inﬂation lead the agents to expect future monetary
policy tightening. The long-term interest rate thus rises faster than the short term rate which
leads to positive term spread. The deviation of both long term real interest rate and real
exchange rate from their equilibrium values in a ”tightening direction” causes output gap and
inﬂation to gradually return to equilibrium. After some ”overshooting” in both inﬂation and
output gap that is driven by the dynamics of nominal exchange rate and falling real interest
rate, the economy converges back to equilibrium. Concentrating on the indicative properties of
the term spread, it is apparent the term spread indicates future real economic activity about 3
15quarters ahead. Similarly, the position of the term spread indicates future inﬂation with a lead
o f5t o6q u a r t e r s .
The right hand panel of ﬁgure 1 shows response of the chosen variables to a supply shock.
Since year to year inﬂation is examined, the original one percentage shock in quarter to quarter
inﬂation is spread out over a longer period. Expected pre-emptive monetary policy is once again
strongly assisted by an appreciation of the real exchange rate driven by the (expected) inﬂation
diﬀerential. Since inﬂation is further pressed down by a negative output gap, the necessary
interest rate hike is much smaller. Still, the trajectory of the term spread is very similar to
the demand shock case because the agents’ perceived reaction function puts strong emphasis
on inﬂation stabilization. As for the indicative power of the term spread, it is unchanged with
regards to future inﬂation, but the term spread is no longer able to predict future real economic
activity. This is a sensible ﬁnding though, since supply shocks do, by their nature, have diﬀerent
impacts on output and price dynamics.15
3.1 The term spread and monetary policy preferences
We now turn to examine the role of monetary policy preferences on the relation between
the term spread and future inﬂation and real economic activity. Modifying coeﬃcients in the
reaction function (4) allows us to perform diﬀerent experiments. We start oﬀ by examining the
role of interest rate smoothing.
Interest rate smoothing
The motivation for altering the degree to which central bank smoothes interest rates may
vary. Let us take on a speciﬁc transition economy factor for smoothing: extreme vulnerability
to capital ﬂows. Countries in transition often exhibit high interest rate diﬀerentials to the
rest of the world, which — together with ﬁnancial account liberalization — cause high volume
of speculative capital inﬂow. Further, policymakers in these countries often set interest rates
15Further reﬁnement could be made with regard to the so called ”escape clauses” or ”caveats” that some
inﬂation targeting central banks use in the case of temporary supply shocks. The aim of such measures is to ex
ante communicate that the bank will not aim to fulﬁll its inﬂation target. This should ensure that unnecessary
output losses are avoided while the bank’s credibility is not aﬀected by missing the inﬂation target. Taking this
complication into account would require speciﬁcation of an asymmetric (agents’ perceived) reaction function.
This remains a challenge for further research.
16with respect to some ”marginal” or ”limit” level of interest rate diﬀerential after which massive
capital outﬂow is believed to occur, causing shock exchange rate depreciation. If policymakers
are unsure of this ”limit” level, they will be very cautious in setting their interest rates. But
once domestic interest rates are close to foreign interest rates, the diﬀerential is too small to
attract speculative capital and the caution in setting interest rates may decrease. This will
mean more ﬂexible monetary policy, in other words less interest rate smoothing. We reﬂect
this in our model by lowering the coeﬃcient α41 in reaction function (4) from 0,8 to 0,5. The
responses are shown in ﬁgure 2.




























The simulation results show that more ﬂexible monetary policy results in smaller volatility
of inﬂation and real output (in the demand shock panel) around their equilibrium values in
comparison to the baseline case in ﬁgure 1. Monetary policy is less bound by former levels
of interest rates and may be faster and more emphatic in eliminating the consequences of the
shocks. Short-term nominal interest rate is logically more volatile. There seems to be no great
diﬀerence in the indicative abilities of the term spread: spread still predicts future inﬂation
about 6 quarters ahead.
Strict inﬂation targeting
The motivation for examining the predictive power of the term spread under two alternative
extreme cases — strict inﬂation targeting here and strict output targeting later on — can be
illustrated by a simple example. Suppose there are two countries (A and B) both expected to
17be hit by an identical supply shock. Further suppose that central bank’s A only goal is stable
prices and central bank’s B only goal is stable output. What happens with the yield curve in
the two countries after the agents ﬁnd out about the expected shock? It is likely that country
A will see an upward sloping yield curve, i.e. a positive term spread. The reason is that agents
will expect the bank to rise future interest rates in order to prevent future rise in inﬂation. On
the contrary, country B’s agents will probably expect the central bank to cut rates in the future
in order to prevent negative impact of the supply shock on real economic activity. This will lead
to downward sloping yield curve and thus negative term spread. As this example illustrates,
the predictive power of the term spread may be policy dependent - the change of the slope of
the yield curve in reaction to expected shocks depends on central bank’s preferences. Let us
now examine this proposition more formally.
We start oﬀ by strict inﬂation targeting. We deﬁne this strategy using our model by setting
the coeﬃcient on the output gap in the reaction function equal to zero and in the same time
increasing the coeﬃcient on inﬂation (deviation from target) in order to make the results more
vigorous. We set α42 =5a n dα43= 0. The results are depicted in ﬁgure 3.




























Demand shock responses of both inﬂation and output gap are very similar to the benchmark
case in ﬁgure 1. This is because the output gap that serves as an initial propagation variable
for demand shock enters inﬂation through the Phillips curve equation (2) and so even strict
inﬂation targeting central bank cares about the output gap to the extent it aﬀects inﬂation (see
18footnote 13 for a related point). Furthermore, even in the baseline case, the weight put on price
level stabilization is much higher compared to that put on output gap stabilization.
In the case of a supply shock shown in the right panel of ﬁgure 3, the results are, however,
very diﬀerent from those in ﬁgure 1. The supply shock induced fall in output gap is now not a
”problem” for the central bank, it is even welcome since it helps to contain the inﬂation pres-
sures. Agents are well aware of this and expect more aggressive restriction, which is manifested
in higher long-term nominal interest rate and thus higher term spread. Because of the absence
of a ”trade-oﬀ”b e t w e e ni n ﬂation and real economic activity in the minds of policymakers, the
path of inﬂation is logically smoother in this case than in the benchmark case. The predictive
ability of the term spread seems to remain unaﬀected: spread is a good indicator of future
inﬂation.
Strict output targeting
We now turn to the other extreme case and examine the predictive power of the term spread
under strict output targeting. Again we decided to model a case, where not only is the weight
put on inﬂation decreased to zero, but the weight put on output is increased compared to the
baseline case. We set α42 = 0 and α43 = 5. Figure 4 shows the results.




























Examining ﬁgure 4, it is clear that under strict output targeting the term spread is a good
indicator of future real economic activity. It is important that this holds true under both types
19of shocks. Further, it is apparent that the lead horizon has shortened: while the demand shock
responses in our benchmark case indicated a 3 quarters ahead predictive horizon, during strict
output targeting the spread predicts future real output 2 quarters ahead. This is due to the
speciﬁcation of the reaction function where there is no lag between changes in output and policy
reaction and the agents thus expect the restriction to come much ”closer” before the shock. As
for the predictive ability of the term spread for future inﬂation, it completely disappears in the
case of strict output targeting. This is in line with our illustration (country A and B) above.
3.2 The term spread and the formation of expectations
Since the predictive ability of the term spread is based on agents’ expectations of future
economic development, the way agents form expectations is possibly a key determinant of
the relation between the term spread and future inﬂation or economic activity. This section
examines this proposition. We ﬁrst focus on the way agents set long-term interest rates based
on expected short-term rates and then on the way inﬂation and exchange rate expectations are
formed.
Long-term interest rates and the rational expectations hypothesis
When specifying the model in chapter 2, we discussed possible reasons for the empirical
failure of the REH. Our baseline speciﬁcation was based on the ﬁndings of Kotlán (1999c) that
the REH holds in the Czech interbank market. In this section, we relax the assumption that
all agents set long-term interest rates according to the REH.
There is, however, another reason for doing so apart from the problems of empirical evalua-
tion of the REH mentioned in chapter 2. Let us provide a short informal exposition. The model
set up in chapter 2 assumes that agents on the ﬁnancial market and the central bank have the
same information and think in the same way. In reality it is, nevertheless, likely that there exist
numerous information asymmetries between the bank and the agents. Since agents are often
unsure about the way the central bank will react to given forecast or data, one of the asym-
metries concerns the monetary policy preferences or central bank’s reaction function.16 The
16For a discussion of this asymmetry in connection to transparency and credibility issues, see Faust and
Svensson (1998).
20impact of this uncertainty on the indicative properties of the term spread is partly discussed
by Roley and Sellon (1996) and Favero (2001). The authors of the former paper work with
a naive single-equation model of the economy and examine the impact of unexpected central
bank’s behavior on the yield curve. The latter paper shows, using a GE macroeconomic model,
that it may be this uncertainty about monetary policy preferences that often leads to empirical
rejection of the REH.
We approach the problem by supposing that the fraction of agents who are unsure about
central bank’s reaction function set long-term interest rates in a naive way by identifying them
with current short-term interest rates. Speciﬁcally, we suppose that half of all the agents
behave in this way and we thus set the coeﬃcient α51 in equation (5) to 0,5. Figure 5 depicts
the responses of the observed variables to demand and supply shock simulations.





























Examination of the responses and their comparison with the benchmark results of ﬁgure 1
leads to the following conclusion: while the responses of inﬂation and real economic activity
are similar, the elasticity of their relationships with the term spread changes signiﬁcantly. The
predictive ability of the term spread does not fail but there is a marked quantitative change
further explored below in 3.3.
Expectations about future exchange rate and inﬂation
While the previous paragraphs examined what happens to the indicative properties of the
term spread if the number of agents who form expectations rationally or ”model consistently”
21goes down, this section takes up an opposite question. We examine the impact of increased
”expectations rationality” on the term spread’s predictive power. Namely, we increase the
fraction of forward-looking agents in the UIP equation (3) and decrease the fraction of backward-
looking agents in the inﬂation expectations equation (10). We choose not to model a completely
rational expectations case since this seems rather unrealistic and instead set α31=0 , 9a n dβ11=
0,1 (in line with the baseline case we reset α51 back to zero). Simulation results are summarized
in ﬁgure 6.



























The basic feature of responses in ﬁgure 6 as compared to our benchmark case in ﬁgure 1 is
faster convergence of the variables towards their long-term equilibrium levels. Further, we can
see that the forward-looking nature of the economy enables the central bank to pursue a less
aggressive monetary policy. Another ﬁnding is that with a more ”forward-looking economy”,
both demand and supply shocks lead to deeper initial fall of real economic activity. After
inspecting the responses of other variables not shown in ﬁgure 6, we conclude this is so because
of a quick initial appreciation of the exchange rate driven by forward-looking agents. If the
change in expectations formation process occurs only on the goods market (inﬂation), the
response of the output gap mimics closely that shown in ﬁgure 1. Overall, the term spread is
still a good predictor of future inﬂation.
3.3 Summary of the results and discussion
The results of this chapter are summarized in table 1 below. The ﬁrst column characterizes
the type of simulation performed and thus also the question we tried to address. The second
22column shows the value of modiﬁed model coeﬃcients used in the given simulation. The third
column presents our results with regard to future inﬂa t i o na n dt h ef o u r t hw i t hr e g a r dt of u t u r e
real economic activity. The results are presented in a simple yes/no form (i.e. indicate/doesn’t
indicate future inﬂation or output) with optimal lead horizon in parenthesis. Apart from this,
we further scrutinize the results by performing series of OLS regressions using the data values
obtained in the performed simulations: we let inﬂation and real economic activity be explained
by the term spread. For the sake of brevity, we only report the coeﬃcient on the term spread
(always signiﬁcant on standard levels) and the ﬁt of the regression using R2.



















yes (5-6) no (3) Baseline original
0,99 (0,85) 1,48 (0,58) 1,79 (0,63) 0,59 (0,02)
yes (5-6) no (3) Smaller
smoothing
41 = 0,5
0,3 (0,49) 0,58 (0,37) 0,81 (0,48) 0,25 (-0,01)
yes (5-6) no (3) Strict inflation
targeting
42 = 5
43 = 0 0,74 (0,84) 0,72 (0,68) 1,56 (0,65) 0,5 (-0,01)
no yes (2) Strict output
targeting
42 = 0
43 = 5 -0,01 (-0,01) 1,38 (0,02) 0,69 (0,72) 0,67 (0,53)
yes (6) no (3) REH partly
ignored
51 = 0,5
51 = 0,8 2,04 (0,85) 2,74 (0,61) 3,55 (0,64) 1,79 (0,19)




11 = 0,1 1,31 (0,64) 1,48 (0,48) 1,55 (0,3) 0,66 (0,15)
The baseline simulation results are reported in the ﬁrst row. The indicative power of the
term spread for future inﬂation is substantial. In an attempt to come up with a single coeﬃcient
linking the current value of the term spread to future inﬂation, we estimated a simultaneous
SUR regression using the data from both the demand and the supply shock simulations. The
result suggests that a term spread of one percentage point (p.p.) indicates future inﬂation
0,94 p.p. above the inﬂation target in 6 quarters. The fourth column shows the results with
respect to future real economic activity. Although the coeﬃcients have the expected signs, the
low ﬁt of the regressions conﬁrms the results of section 3.1: the term spread is not a good
indicator of future real economic activity in the Czech economy. Since the model with the
23original coeﬃcients should track the real data of the Czech economy most closely, we would
expect the results to be in line with those of Kotlán (1999a) and Kotlán (1999b) that examined
the predictive power of the term spread using a simple single-equation approach. The outcomes
support the ﬁnding of the former study but oppose the ﬁndings of the latter one. We believe
this can be explained by the criticisms put forth in the introduction, especially the point made
by Woodford (1994) and Bernanke and Woodford (1997) seems relevant here.
After reviewing the results of the baseline simulations, let us now inspect the ﬁndings with
regard to the role of monetary policy preferences for the predictive ability of the term spread.
The outcomes are summarized in rows 2 - 4 of table 1. Smaller interest rate smoothing, i.e.
more activist monetary policy, leads to a weakening of the predictive ability. Lower ﬁto fb o t h
regressions and smaller SUR coeﬃcient (0,3) is not surprising. If the agents are aware of the fact
that monetary policy will react to changes in economic conditions more ﬂexibly, the term spread
becomes more volatile. Since higher policy ﬂexibility at the same time leads to lower volatility
of inﬂation and output, the relation between these variables and the term spread becomes
weaker. Strict inﬂation targeting on the other hand leads to an increase in the robustness of
the relation between the term spread and future inﬂation. This is apparent not only by looking
at the ﬁt of the supply shock regression and converging coeﬃcients for both types of shocks,
but also from the results of SUR regression coeﬃcient (0,74) that is close to both individual
regression coeﬃcients. In strict inﬂation targeting, the term spread predicts future inﬂation
but not future real economic activity. The results are completely reversed in the case of strict
output targeting. Inspecting the results in the fourth row, we can see that while the indicative
properties in terms of future inﬂation disappeared, the term spread now indicates future real
economic activity very successfully. Regression coeﬃcients for both demand and supply shock
are very close, a fact manifested in SUR regression coeﬃcient of 0,69. The ﬁt of the regressions
also increases markedly. In strict output targeting regime, term spread of one percentage point
indicates future real output 0,69 p.p. above potential.
The above results diﬀer substantially from those of Estrella (1998) who concludes that
under strict output targeting the term spread predicts future real output (4 quarters ahead)
and inﬂation (8 quarters ahead) and that strict inﬂation targeting leads to complete erosion of
the indicative properties the term spread. We believe the diﬀerences can be explained to a great
24extent by the role of the exchange rate transmission channel in a small open economy. Consider
two examples. First, the fact that in the strict output targeting case we ﬁnd no link with
future inﬂation can be blamed on exchange rate appreciation that pushes inﬂation back to the
target quickly (see demand shock responses depicted in ﬁgure 4). Second, the shorter predictive
horizons indicated by our results can again be attributed to the working of the exchange rate
transmission channel that greatly speeds up monetary policy eﬀe c t si nas m a l lo p e ne c o n o m y .
Another series of simulations was performed in section 3.2 with the aim of examining the
inﬂuence of the way expectations are formed. The results are summarized in the last two rows
of table 1. Even though the predictive power of the term spread stays high, the relation is
quantitatively diﬀerent. Namely, if the fraction of agents not setting long-term interest rates
in accordance with the rational expectations hypothesis i n c r e a s e s ,t h es a m ev a l u eo ft h et e r m
spread indicates future inﬂa t i o nh i g h e ra b o v et h et a r g e tt h a ni nt h eb a s e l i n ec a s e .T h ef a c tt h a t
agents do not set long-term interest rates based on expected central bank’s action, makes the
central bank behave more aggressively: higher short-term rates are necessary to inﬂuence long-
term rates and the term spread thus falls. Smaller spread is then connected to the same values
of inﬂation and real output. Formally, this is conﬁrmed by higher SUR regression coeﬃcient of
1,95. The result implies that if a central bank intends to use the term spread as an indicator
of future inﬂation, it ﬁrst needs to know just how good a description of the agents’ behavior
the rational expectations hypothesis is. Without this understanding, it is impossible to judge
how high inﬂation is expected to be in the future. The last row summarizes the results for the
case of almost rational exchange rate and inﬂation expectations. The term spread stays a good
indicator of future inﬂation: SUR regression coeﬃcient of 1,05 is quite similar to the baseline
case and the ﬁt of the regressions is reasonable.
254. Conclusions
The main ﬁndings of this paper can be summarized as follows:
1. The predictive ability of the term spread with regard to future inﬂation and real economic
activity is not structural but depends on monetary policy preferences and on the behavior of
agents in a given economy. It is therefore necessary to use a structural model of the economy
with endogenous monetary policy to ﬁnd out what variables and with what lead the term spread
predicts.
2. The term spread’s predictive ability with regard to future inﬂation increases with in-
creasing weight on inﬂation stabilization in central bank’s reaction function. Similarly, the
term spread’s predictive ability with regard to future real economic activity increases with
increasing weight on real economic activity stabilization in central bank’s reaction function.
3. In order to use the term spread as an indicator for monetary policy, it is important to
know the degree to which agents on average behave according to the expectations theory when
setting long-term interest rates and to know the way agents form their inﬂation and exchange
rate expectations.
4. In the Czech economy, the term spread between one year and three month PRIBOR
interest rates of one percentage point indicates that agents expect inﬂation to be almost one
percentage point above the target 6 quarters ahead.
Overall, the results show that the term spread may be a useful indicator for conducting
monetary policy. This explains why the term structure of interest rates is closely watched by
many central banks. Goodhart (1993) and Piazzesi (2001) even argue that the term spread
directly enters reaction function of some central banks. Other authors, however, warn that
monetary policy decisions should not be too closely tied to any variable strongly inﬂuenced by
expectations. This argument is, of course, based on the well known Lucas (1976) critique or
its variant labeled as Goodhart’s (1981) law. If the relationship between future inﬂation and
its indicator is driven by agents’ expectations, and if monetary policy reacts to the indicator
with the aim to inﬂuence future inﬂation, then it is likely, that this reaction will change agents’
26expectations. This will in turn diminish the usefulness of the indicator. Is it really true that if
a central bank starts to use a certain relationship for policy purposes, the relationship become
unstable and it is not possible to use it for policy anymore? We believe this is only true in
cases when the relationship is not based on a structural model but rather comes out of ex post
regressions (i.e. an approach criticized in the introduction) or in cases when the indicator is the
only policy guide available to a central bank. However, if monetary policy decisions are based
on a structural macroeconomic forecast, the term spread is a very useful indicator for monetary
policy.
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32Appendix
Table A1
Predicts future real output Predicts future (change in) inflation Author(s)
Yes No yes no
Mishkin (1991) France, Germany,
UK
Canada, Switzerland
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